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Abstract
We develop an equilibrium theory of credit rating in the presence of rollover risk. By influ-
encing rational creditors, ratings affect sovereigns' probability of default, which in turn affects
ratings. Our analysis reveals a pro-cyclical impact of credit rating: in equilibrium the presence
of a rating agency increases default risk when it is high, and decreases default risk when it is
low.
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1. Introduction
When short term borrowing is used to finance long term needs, debtors are vulnerable to
swings in market sentiment. This vulnerability is inherent in sovereign debt markets, where
investors may suddenly refuse to roll over their short term claims on a country. Since the
1980s, such liquidity crises have recurred and created havoc in emerging market economies,
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such as Mexico, Russia and Argentina. More recently, similar crises occurred in Europe, where
Greece, Ireland and Portugal were effectively shut out of the bond market in 2010 and 2011,
and concerns spread that Spain and Italy could meet the same fate. It is widely believed that
in these episodes, pessimistic investor expectations played a propagating role.
When investor expectations are decisive, any event that coordinates expectations might
in principle be pivotal. In particular, credit ratings might serve such a role. Indeed, in
crisis periods, politicians and observers often blame rating agencies. For example, in a joint
letter dated 6 May 2010, Chancellor Angela Merkel and President Nicolas Sarkozy wrote that
`The decision of a rating agency to downgrade the rating of the Greek debt even before the
authorities' programme and amount of the support package were known must make us ponder
the rating agencies' role in propagating crises.'2 A natural instinct is of course to discredit such
statements as coming from politicians eager to cloud their own responsibility for an ongoing
crisis. Yet, the question at hand is important, and should not be dismissed without a rigorous
answer. This paper therefore scrutinizes the role of credit rating agencies in the presence of
rollover risk.
We analyze the problem faced by a credit rating agency (CRA) about to rate sovereign
debt in a situation where coordination failure among investors might cause default. As Manso
(2013), we assume that the CRA optimally chooses ratings in order to preserve its track
record of correct predictions.3 The CRA realizes that its rating may affect whether or not
2See also Paul Krugman's New York Times article `Berating the raters', April 26, 2010, or Ferri, Liu and
Stiglitz (1999). Another example is Helmut Reisen (2010) Head of Research, OECD Development Centre:
`Unless sovereign ratings can be turned into proper early warning systems, they will continue to add to the
instability of international capital flows, to make returns to investors more volatile than they need be, and to
reduce the benefits of capital markets for recipient countries.'
3A quote of Thomas McGuire, former VP at Moody's, summarizes this motivation: `What's driving us is
primarily the issue of preserving our track record. That's our bread and butter' (Manso, 2013).
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the sovereign defaults, and acts strategically by taking this effect into account in deciding
what rating to give. Hence, there is potential feedback between rollover risk and ratings.
Importantly, investors are rational and realize that the rating agency is strategic. When
investors interpret a rating, they therefore take the CRA's incentives and constraints into
account. Thus, a central contribution of our analysis is that ratings and investors' response
to them are determined in equilibrium. This is important, as to address how CRAs affect
coordination failure one must take investors and credit rating simultaneously into account.
For instance, a policy forcing CRAs to issue more positive ratings in times of crisis is likely
to fail as investors adjust their behavior accordingly.
To model the problem facing the rating agency, we use the framework in Morris and Shin
(2006), where a sovereign needs to roll over short-term debt. We extend the model by adding
a strategic rating agency, which observes a noisy signal of the fundamental (the sovereign's
alternative means of short term financing) and reports a rating which is either good or bad.
A mass of creditors decide whether or not to roll over their loan, based on the rating of the
CRA as well as their own private signal of the fundamental. Withdrawing the loan involves
a partial loss, but allows creditors to receive immediate payment and avoid the risk of a
later default due to coordination failure. Investors discount delayed payments according to
their immediate need for cash: when liquidity is tight, investors discount future payments
more. Before making their decisions, investors update their beliefs based on the rating by the
CRA. Investors' decisions and the realized value of the fundamental then determine whether
the sovereign defaults. As highlighted above, the CRA takes these effects into account when
choosing what rating to assign.
We first examine ratings' equilibrium impact. Tight liquidity makes investors more reluc-
tant to roll their loan over, while it is of no direct concern to the CRA, which only wants to
predict the correct outcome. Therefore, when liquidity is tight, an individual investor requires
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a better signal to roll over his loan than what the CRA requires to issue a positive rating. If
the CRA in spite of its more lenient threshold issues a bad rating, it will therefore tend to
influence investors' beliefs  and the incidence of default  more than a good rating would.
Conversely, when investors have low liquidity needs, they are willing to accept a higher risk of
default than what the CRA requires to announce a good rating. Consequently, when liquidity
is easy, a good rating tends to influence investors' beliefs more than a bad rating would. Note
that, in the absence of credit rating, default is already more likely when aggregate liquidity
is tight. Hence, our analysis reveals a pro-cyclical impact of credit rating: CRAs increase
default risk when it is high, and decrease default risk when it is low.
We then explore the implications of our main result for the equilibrium frequency of good
and bad ratings. We show that when liquidity is easy, the frequency of good ratings is high
compared to the `private' assessment of an independent observer with the same information as
the CRA. Symmetrically, when liquidity is tight, the frequency of bad ratings is high compared
to the `private' assessment of an independent observer. The basic intuition is straightforward:
because the CRA aims to make correct predictions, it will exploit its ability to affect the
outcome. Hence, the more strongly a rating affects default risk, the more attractive this
rating becomes. Because tight liquidity makes a bad rating more influential than a good
rating, it also makes a bad rating the more attractive choice. By the same token, when
liquidity is easy, a good rating is attractive, relative to a bad one. Our analysis therefore
suggests that in times of booms credit rating of sovereign debt may appear overly generous,
whereas during crises credit rating can appear overly harsh. Note that these results do not
invoke any exogenous bias in the payoff structure of CRAs. Instead, they highlight that rating
standards might endogenously vary over time according to the state of the economy.
Theoretical research on credit rating agencies has burgeoned over the last years. Yet, to
our knowledge Manso (2013) is the only previous paper to explore optimal CRA decisions and
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the feedback effects arising when ratings affect the performance of rated assets. While both
papers explore the feedback effects of credit ratings, our paper and Manso's take substan-
tively different approaches. In particular, Manso focuses on the strategic interaction between
CRAs and issuers, while our focus is on the strategic interaction between CRAs and creditors,
allowing us to derive new results regarding the pro-cyclical nature of credit rating.
Our analysis also relates to studies of how CRAs might coordinate investors. Boot et al.
(2006) develop a model with moral hazard in which credit ratings provide a focal point for
firms and investors, and help select the most efficient equilibrium. By contrast, Carlson and
Hale (2006) show in a global games setting similar to ours how a non-strategic CRA, which
simply passes its information on to the market, may induce multiple equilibria by publicly
revealing its information. We extend their analysis by considering ratings as strategically
chosen by the CRA, and all our interesting implications come from the endogenous choice of
a rating.
In global games more generally, precise public information enhances the scope for multi-
plicity; see for instance Morris and Shin (2003) or Hellwig (2002). This effect naturally arises
in our model, too. If the CRA has sufficiently precise information, its rating may coordinate
investors completely. Thus, the CRA may essentially decide what the outcome will be. This
relates to the literature on whether a large investor may coordinate other investors, making
a currency crisis more likely (Corsetti, Dasgupta, Morris and Shin, 2004). Yet our focus is
elsewhere. We want to explore a setting where the CRA may influence investors through their
beliefs, but without having the superior position that prevails in a global games setting when
there is an agent - the CRA in our case - which may provide a public signal with sufficiently
high precision. Thus, we parameterize our model to obtain a unique equilibrium. Our main
innovation lies in the fact that the rating agency behaves strategically, and takes the equilib-
rium effects of its rating into account. Relative to the global games literature overall, we thus
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contribute by studying a strategic sender of public information. In this respect, our paper is
closer in spirit to Angeletos, Hellwig and Pavan (2006) who study the endogenous information
generated by policy interventions. In a broader perspective, our paper relates to studies of
self-fulfilling crises at large, such as the bank-run model of Diamond and Dybvig (1983).
A large strand of the credit rating literature focuses on potential sources of rating inflation.
One explanation is rating shopping,- debtors' option to strategically shop among alternative
agencies' assessments. Prominent examples here are Skreta and Veldkamp (2009) and San-
giorgi and Spatt (2011). Compared to these studies, our paper highlights that the frequency
of good ratings might be elevated even in the absence of issuers' rating shopping, due instead
to creditors' changing liquidity needs. Another branch of this literature focuses on how rating
inflation may be driven by strategic behavior by CRAs motivated by rating fees. For example,
Mathis et al. (2009) explores how CRAs might first build a reputation via truthful reporting,
only to milk it down by repeatedly inflating ratings thereafter. Bolton, Freixas and Shapiro
(2012) focus on how an agency might exploit naive investors who mechanically follow their
advice. Opp, Opp and Harris (2013) study how a CRA might exploit regulatory rules that
are based on ratings.
Our paper naturally relates to the extensive literature on expectations-driven sovereign
debt crises. Cornerstone contributions there are Calvo (1988) and Cole and Kehoe (2000).
The model we base our analysis on has previously been used by Morris and Shin (2006) and
Corsetti, Guimaraes and Roubini (2006) to study the role of IMF interventions in curbing
sovereign debt crises. Importantly, in their studies the IMF decision to support a sovereign
with short term assistance does not serve as a signal to investors, but affects outcomes by
directly reducing the sovereign's need for market financing. In contrast, the signalling effect
is exactly how a CRA affects outcomes in our study.
While our study focuses on sovereign debt, its basic insights should carry over to other
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settings where asset performance is sensitive to ratings. Our prediction of procyclical ratings
is consistent with Amato and Furfine (2004), who find that new ratings typically have a
procyclical effect. Our results are also related to the widespread empirical finding that ratings
tend to affect investor behavior asymmetrically, with negative rating events having stronger
effects than positive events, or vice versa. The pattern was first highlighted by Holthausen and
Leftwich (1986), and multiple studies have later shown that this pattern holds for a broad set
of asset classes. Among these studies, some have documented the pattern for sovereign debt,
such as Afonso, Furceri and Gomes (2012) and Ismailescu and Kazemi (2010). Our model
implies asymmetric rating effects, and ties this phenomenon to the state of the economy. For
instance, if liquidity is tight, in our model bad ratings matter more than good ones.4
The paper is organized as follows. The model is presented in Section 2. Section 3 solves
the model and presents our results. Section 4 concludes. All proofs are contained in the
Appendix.
2. Model
Our framework builds on Morris and Shin's (2006) model of the rollover problem encoun-
tered by a sovereign relying on short-term debt. We lay out that model and enhance it by
introducing a strategic credit rating agency (CRA) communicating information to creditors
about the fundamental status of the sovereign.
Debt rollover. There are two main periods, t = 1, 2. A unit mass of investors (or
creditors), indexed by i, are financing a sovereign using a conventional debt contract. At
4Given that our model is static, we cannot strictly account for downgrades or upgrades. However, if a CRA
has given a rating in the past, then as time elapses this rating looses relevance. By the time a new rating is
announced, the situation may therefore to some extent be similar to one where no previous rating existed, as
our model assumes.
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t = 1 each investor faces the option to (a) liquidate his loan to the sovereign for a payment
normalized to 1 or (b) rollover his loan to the sovereign. In the latter case the contract specifies
a final period payment V , unless the sovereign defaults, in which case investors receive 0.
As our main goal is to examine the effect of the strategic CRA in the presence of rollover
risk, we follow Morris and Shin (2006) and assume that the sovereign's ability to meet short
term claims is the sole source of uncertainty; this is the decisive factor for whether the sovereign
defaults or not. Let l denote the mass of investors liquidating at time t = 1. The ability to
meet short term claims, and thereby avoid default, is summarized by the random variable
θ. One may think of θ as the sovereign's stock of liquid reserves, including all assets it can
liquidate in the short run, or access to alternative credit lines other than the debt market. If
θ ≥ l, then the sovereign meets its short term claims, and investors who in the first period
chose to roll over obtain payment V at t = 2. If θ < l, the sovereign defaults, and those who
chose to roll over get nothing. Note that if θ ≥ 1, the sovereign never defaults, even if all
creditors liquidate. By contrast, default occurs with certainty if θ < 0. However, if θ ∈ [0, 1),
the sovereign may or may not default, depending on the behavior of creditors. In that case,
a coordination problem prevails: Each investor would gain if all were to roll over their loan
to the sovereign, but no investor would gain from being the only one to do so. Let I denote
the indicator variable taking value 1 if the sovereign repays, and 0 if it defaults. Then I = 1
if and only if θ ≥ l.
Information. The fundamental, θ, is uniformly distributed over Θ = [Θ,Θ]. While θ is
unobserved, its distribution is commonly known. In addition, investors are privately informed
about θ through the signals {xi} uniformly distributed over [θ−β, θ+β]. The CRA for its part
is privately informed about θ through the signal y, uniformly distributed over [θ − α, θ + α].
All signals are conditionally independent and Θ < −max{α, β} while Θ > 1 + max{α, β}.
With a slight abuse to save on notation we use Θ for the support of all random variables
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above.
Ratings and strategies. Before t = 1, all creditors observe the rating of the CRA. For
tractability, we follow the bulk of the literature and assume that a credit rating, r, is a binary
variable, where a rating is either `good' (r = 1) or `bad' (r = 0).5 More specifically, a CRA
strategy is a threshold τ ∈ Θ specifying r = 1 if y ≥ τ and r = 0 if y < τ .6 The strategy of
investor i is a map σi : Θ × {0, 1} → {0, 1}, specifying whether to liquidate (σi = 0) or roll
over (σi = 1) at time t = 1 as a function of his private signal xi and the credit rating r.
For any z ∈ Θ, define the intervals R+z and R−z by: R+z := [z,Θ], R−z := [Θ, z]. Notice
that if the CRA uses strategy τ , then r = 0 ⇒ θ ∈ R−τ+α and similarly r = 1 ⇒ θ ∈ R+τ−α.
Hence for convenience, if the CRA uses strategy τ we will sometimes use the interval R−τ+α
to represent the rating r = 0 and R+τ−α to represent r = 1. This is useful for the exposition
as it identifies broadly speaking a credit rating, which is an announcement in {0, 1}, with the
informational content of that announcement.7
Next, let R− := {R−z }z∈Θ, R+ := {R+z }z∈Θ, and R := R−∪R+. When we wish to identify
5There are two reasons why binary ratings simplify our analysis. First, our analysis starts from the
premise that the CRA aims to be correct, which is straightforward to define with binary ratings but has no
obvious definition with more ratings. Second, with a strategic CRA the number of ratings, as defined by their
information content, would be an equilibrium object and hence an additional variable to solve for in itself.
In an early version of our paper, we allowed for any finite number of ratings and found sufficient conditions
under which the CRA effectively chooses only two ratings in equilibrium. However, tractability then required
strong assumptions on CRA preferences (see Holden, Natvik, and Vigier (2012)).
6Thus a CRA strategy can be viewed as a commitment to announce r = 1 if and only if y ≥ τ . It can
be shown show that, if investors interpret credit ratings as resulting from a CRA strategy τ , then the CRA's
best response as a function of y exhibits a threshold τ ′ such that r = 1 if and only if y ≥ τ ′. In equilibrium,
we will require τ ′ to be equal to τ .
7If the CRA strategy is τ , one should think of the credit rating r = 0 as a message conveying y < τ , and
of r = 1 as a message conveying y ≥ τ .
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a rating with its informational content, we will refer to R ∈ R as a rating. In this sense R
denotes the set of all possible ratings. Finally, for all R ∈ R, define R := max{θ : θ ∈ R} and
R := min{θ : θ ∈ R}.
Payoffs. The preferences of an investor are summarized by the function u(w1, w2) =
w1 + δw2, where wt indicates payments received in period t, and δ ∈ (0, 1) is a discount factor.
In the context of our paper the discount factor is naturally interpreted in terms of creditors'
liquidity needs: δ is low when investors have strong immediate needs for cash, as for instance
in a liquidity squeeze, or when investors face important margin calls on other positions. The
quantity λ := (δV )−1 plays a key role in this paper. We will say that liquidity is tight when λ
is high, and that liquidity is easy when λ is low. Observe in particular that if λ ≥ 1, then all
investors always liquidate. We thus focus on λ ∈ (0, 1), as this is the critical region of interest.
As Manso (2013), we assume that the objective of the CRA is to preserve its track record
of `correct predictions'. There are two ways to be correct in this environment: the CRA may
give a good rating to a sovereign that later repays, or give a bad rating to a sovereign that
later defaults. The CRA obtains a payoff normalized to 1 if r = 1 and the sovereign later
repays, or if r = 0 and the sovereign later defaults.8 The CRA obtains zero payoff in the two
other cases, where its rating turns out to be `incorrect'. Let Π(r, I) denote the payoff of the
CRA as a function of the rating r and outcome I: Π(r, I) = Ir + (1− I)(1− r).
Beliefs. We say that investor i updates beliefs using (A1)-(A2) if his posterior upon
observing rating R ∈ R satisfies the following: (A1) the posterior attaches probability 1 to
8In an earlier version of this paper (Holden, Natvik, and Vigier (2012)), we examine asymmetric payoffs
where the CRA prefers to successfully predict default rather than success, or vice versa. The main insight
from this extension is that any such bias is self-defeating in equilibrium, since investors internalize how bias
in CRA preferences affect ratings.
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θ = R if R < xi − β and probability 1 to θ = R if xi + β < R, (A2) the posterior is uniform
on [xi − β, xi + β] ∩ R in all other cases. Let Pˆ(.|xi, R) denote the probability measure when
i updates beliefs using (A1)-(A2), and Eˆ[.|xi, R] the corresponding expectation.
Assumption (A1) pins down investors' off-path beliefs, and guarantees the existence of a
unique equilibrium in the investment game analyzed in Section 3.1 following deviations of the
CRA.9
Assumption (A2) is enforced to keep the model analytically tractable.10 We discuss in
Section 3.2 why we expect our insights to carry through without this approximation.
Timing. The timing of the game is as follows. CRA and investors first observe their
private signals. The CRA then announces its rating and the game moves into period 1, during
which investors simultaneously decide whether to roll over their loans to the sovereign, or to
liquidate. Investors who liquidate receive payment 1. In period 2, if θ < l, investors who chose
to roll over receive nothing; if θ ≥ l, investors who chose to roll over receive payment V .
Approximate Equilibrium. An approximate rating equilibrium is a pair (τ, {σi}) con-
sisting of a strategy τ for the CRA as well as a strategy σi for each investor i, with the following
9Since our signals have bounded supports we need to specify an investor's beliefs following a credit rating
inconsistent with his own private signal.
10With Bayesian updating, the posterior probability density of θ conditional on, say, y <
τ , tapers off at the edge of its domain and is uniform only on [Θ, τ − α). This makes
the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium extremely complicated to characterize. To see why, start from
P (θ|r, xi) = P (r|θ)P (θ|xi)/
∫
θ
P (r|θ)P (θ|xi) dθ. Under, say, a bad rating, the denominator is given by∫ xi+β
xi−β P (r = 0|θ)P (θ|xi) dθ =
∫max(τ−α,xi−β)
x∗−β P (r = 0|θ)P (θ|xi) dθ +
∫min(xi+β,τ+α)
max(τ−α,xi−β) P (r = 0|θ)P (θ|xi) dθ.
The min and max operators imply that there is no single expression that characterizes posterior proba-
bilities. Moreover, which expression is relevant to characterize an equilibrium will depend on the threshold τ
and the signal of the marginal investor xi, which both are to be determined in equilibrium.
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properties:11
1. ∀ xi ∈ Θ, ∀ (r, R) ∈
{
(0, R−τ+α), (1, R
+
τ−α
)}:
Eˆ[u(σi(xi, r), σ−i, θ)|xi, R] ≥ Eˆ[u(1− σi(xi, r), σ−i, θ)|xi, R],
2. ∀ y ≥ τ : P(I = 1|y, r = 1) ≥ P(I = 0|y, r = 0),
3. ∀ y < τ : P(I = 0|y, r = 0) ≥ P(I = 1|y, r = 1).
The structure of an approximate rating equilibrium is straightforward. The CRA an-
nounces r = 1 if y ≥ τ , and r = 0 if y < τ . Accounting for this, each investor, upon observing
the rating announced updates his beliefs using (A1)-(A2), and decides optimally whether or
not to roll over his loan given the behavior of other investors (part 1 in the definition). The
final ingredient is as follows: given the behavior of investors described above, the announce-
ment r = 1 must maximize chances of making a correct prediction for y ≥ τ (part 2 in the
definition), whereas r = 0 must maximize chances of a correct prediction for y < τ (part 3
in the definition). Note that our equilibrium concept is based on the standard definition of
perfect Bayesian equilibrium, but is only an approximation due to (A2).
3. Analysis
Equilibrium is solved backwards, by first investigating the impact of a given rating R ∈ R
on the incidence of default. That problem is standard in the literature (see e.g. Morris
and Shin (1998, 2006) or Carlson and Hale (2006)), and therefore summarized briefly in
Section 3.1. Our contribution starts in Section 3.2, where we endogenize credit ratings by
incorporating strategic behavior of the CRA. That section addresses the question: how do
equilibrium credit ratings affect the incidence of default? Section 3.3 examines our model's
11Abusing notation slightly, u(ai, a−i, θ) denotes the payoff of creditor i when the profile of actions of all
creditors is {ak}, and the fundamental is θ.
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predictions concerning the frequency of good and bad ratings as a function of the parameters
of the model. Section 3.4 summarizes the paper's main insight, namely that the equilibrium
impact of credit rating is procyclical: credit rating raises the probability of default when it is
high, and reduces it when it is low.
3.1. Preliminaries
In this section, we focus on the impact of an exogenously given rating R ∈ R on the
incidence of default. We define for that purpose the investment game given rating R as the
game played among investors observing R and following rules (A1)-(A2) to update their
beliefs. The following condition plays an important role:
(A3) 1/(2β + 1) < λ < 1− 1/(2β + 1).
Lemma 1. Assume (A1)-(A2). There exists an equilibrium of the investment game with
rating R, for all R ∈ R, and equilibrium is unique if (A3) holds. In the latter case equilibrium
is characterized by thresholds x∗(R) and θ∗(R) such that σi(xi;R) = 1 ⇔ xi ≥ x∗(R) and
I = 1⇔ θ ≥ θ∗(R).
As (A3) guarantees equilibrium uniqueness in the investment game, in the rest of the analysis
we will assume that (A3) holds. The θ-threshold θ∗(R) above which the sovereign repays will
thus be well-defined for all R ∈ R, and will be the key variable of our analysis.
In the absence of credit rating, how does λ affect the incidence of default? Extending
previous notation, let θ∗(Θ) denote the equilibrium θ-threshold of the investment game in the
absence of credit rating. As λ is the value of liquidating relative to the discounted full repay-
ment value, a creditor prefers rolling over to liquidating if and only if he assigns probability
λ or more to repayment occurring. As λ rises, creditors become more reluctant to roll over
their loan, all else equal. Unsurprisingly therefore, in the absence of credit rating, the higher
λ, the higher too the incidence of default. In fact, Lemma 2 below shows that:
(1) θ∗(Θ) = λ.
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Equation (1) sets a natural benchmark against which to measure the impact of any given
rating on the incidence of default. In particular, the rating R ∈ R reduces the incidence of
default if and only if θ∗(R) < λ, and increases the incidence of default if and only if θ∗(R) > λ.
The next lemma gathers the key properties of θ∗(R) for the analysis of Section 3.2.
Lemma 2. Assume (A1)-(A3). Then, in the absence of credit rating, (1) holds. With credit
rating, the following hold:
1. θ∗(R) ≥ λ if R ∈ R− and θ∗(R) ≤ λ if R ∈ R+,
2. θ∗(R) is non increasing in R if R ∈ R−,
3. θ∗(R) is non increasing in R if R ∈ R+,
4. θ∗(R) > λ ⇔ R ∈ R− and R < (2β + 1)λ,
5. θ∗(R) < λ ⇔ R ∈ R+ and R > (2β + 1)λ− 2β,
6. θ∗(R) is continuous in R if R ∈ R+ and continuous in R if R ∈ R−,
7. θ∗(R) = 1 ⇔ R ≤ 1,
8. θ∗(R) = 0 ⇔ R ≥ 0.
Lemma 2.1 says that a negative rating never reduces the incidence of default, while a positive
rating never increases the incidence of default. Next, one may intuitively think of R as
measuring the `strength' of the information content in a negative rating R ∈ R− and similarly
think of R as measuring the `strength' of a positive rating R ∈ R+. Part 2 of the lemma then
says that the `milder' the negative rating is, the smaller will its impact be. Symmetrically,
Part 3 states that the `stronger' the positive rating is, the greater will its impact be. Parts 4
and 5 embody the idea that ratings must have sufficient informational content to affect the
incidence of default at all. Part 6 shows that the impact of a rating is continuous in the
`strength' of the rating. Recall that the maximum θ-threshold possible is 1, and that the
minimum θ-threshold possible is 0. Hence the maximum impact of a negative rating is to
push θ∗ to 1, and the maximum impact of a positive rating is to push θ∗ to 0. Parts 7 and 8
then state the requirements for ratings to have maximum impact, which will be referred to in
the discussion of equilibrium multiplicity below.
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3.2. Equilibrium Impact of Ratings
This section endogenizes credit ratings by incorporating strategic behavior of the CRA. We
show that rating equilibria exist, and explore how good and bad ratings affect the incidence
of default in equilibrium. Specifically, we show that when default risk is high (i.e. when λ is
large), then the positive impact of a good rating is greater than the negative impact of a bad
rating, and vice versa when default risk is low.
In this section and the next we set a lower bound on the noise parameter α of the private
signal y of the CRA:
(A4) α ≥ 2βmin{λ, 1− λ}.
This assumption ensures equilibrium uniqueness. At the end of this section we discuss the
consequences of relaxing it in some detail. Assumption (A4) implies that α ≥ β if λ = 1/2,
while for λ 6= 1/2, we may have α ≷ β. Interestingly, even if α > β, implying that the
CRA cannot even evaluate creditworthiness more effectively than any individual investor, the
CRA may still provide information that investors find valuable. In part, this is because the
signal observed by the CRA is imperfectly correlated with the investor's private information.
More interestingly, the ratings have extra value because they are public information and thus
place bounds on what any individual investor might believe about other investors' beliefs.
The latter is a possibly powerful source of influence since the investors' choices are strategic
complements.
To start our analysis of endogenous ratings, observe that a strategy τ ∗ of the CRA is part
of a rating equilibrium if and only if
(2) P(θ < θ∗(R−τ∗+α)|y = τ ∗, r = 0) = P(θ ≥ θ∗(R+τ∗−α)|y = τ ∗, r = 1).
This is an indifference condition, stating that a CRA which observes y = τ ∗ must perceive
it as equally likely that a good rating is followed by repayment as it is that a bad rating is
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followed by default. To realize why this condition must hold, consider a situation where at
y = τ ∗ a positive rating is more likely to be followed by repayment than a a bad rating is to
be followed by default. Then, by continuity of the probabilities in y, the CRA would benefit
from giving a good rating also for signals slightly above τ ∗, meaning that a higher threshold
than τ ∗ would actually be optimal.12 Equation (2) is the basis of this section's analysis.
We noted in Section 3.1 that a creditor is indifferent between rolling over and liquidating
his loan if and only if he believes that the sovereign will repay with probability λ. In what
follows we will say that creditor i is a marginal investor if his private signal xi = x
∗(R) is such
that conditional on the rating R, he attaches exactly probability λ to repayment occurring
(see Lemma 1). Let also x∗(Θ) denote the equilibrium threshold private signal in the absence
of credit rating, and denote by M the marginal investor in that benchmark. The private signal
of M is thus xM := x
∗(Θ). With the uniform distribution, equation (2) then implies
P(θ ≥ θ∗(Θ)|xi = xM) = (xM + β)− θ
∗(Θ)
2β
= λ.
As θ∗(Θ) = λ (see Lemma 2), this equation shows that without credit rating: (a) λ > 1/2⇒
xM > λ, whereas (b) λ < 1/2 ⇒ xM < λ. These remarks will be key in the next two
paragraphs.
Suppose first that λ = 1/2. By Lemma 2 it then follows that θ∗(Θ) = 1/2, and by the
remarks above xM = 1/2. Consider now how a CRA using strategy τ = 1/2 affects M's
beliefs. As here xM = τ , the ratings r = 0 and r = 1 have symmetric effects on M's beliefs.
Intuitively, their respective impact on the incidence of default must be symmetric too, i.e.
θ∗(r = 0)− 1/2 = 1/2− θ∗(r = 1). Thus, in particular, (2) holds for τ ∗ = 1/2. It follows that
if λ = 1/2, then τ = 1/2 is part of a rating equilibrium, and therefore that in equilibrium a
good and a bad rating have symmetric impact on the incidence of default.
12A formal proof is in the appendix.
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By contrast, suppose now that λ > 1/2. Then remark (a) above implies xM > λ. In this
scenario, consider how a CRA using strategy τ = λ affects M's beliefs. M now receives a signal
that is greater than the CRA's threshold, that is, xM > τ . It follows that a positive rating
will largely be consistent with M's private signal, and thus have little or no impact on M's
beliefs. In contrast, a negative rating will be in conflict with M's relatively positive private
signal, leading to a much greater revision of M's beliefs. Intuitively, the impact of r = 0 on
the incidence of default will be larger too, i.e. θ∗(r = 0)− λ ≥ λ− θ∗(r = 1).
Naturally, the CRA strategy of τ = λ assumed above need not and typically will not be
part of a rating equilibrium. Nevertheless, Proposition 1 below shows that the remarks made
here about the effects of credit rating do actually hold in a rating equilibrium: if λ > 1/2, a
bad rating increases default risk more than a good rating reduces it. Likewise, if λ < 1/2, a
good rating reduces default risk more than a bad rating increases it.
Proposition 1. Assume (A1)-(A4). Then there exists a unique rating equilibrium. In
equilibrium θ∗(R = 1) ≤ λ ≤ θ∗(R = 0) and:
1. for λ ∈ [1− α/(2β), α/(2β)], ratings have no impact: θ∗(R = 0) = λ = θ∗(R = 1);
2. for λ < min{1/2, 1− α/(2β)}, the impact of a good rating is greater than that of a bad
rating: λ− θ∗(R = 1) > θ∗(R = 0)− λ;
3. for λ > max{1/2, α/(2β)}, the impact of a bad rating is greater than that of a good
rating: θ∗(R = 0)− λ > λ− θ∗(R = 1).
The basic intuition behind Proposition 1 is as follows. When λ is high, the creditors rolling
over their loans all have high private signals of the fundamental θ (to compensate for their
immediate need for cash). Consequently, the effect of a bad rating on those creditors' beliefs
and therefore on the incidence of default tends to be greater than the corresponding effect of
a good rating. By the same token, when λ is low, the creditors liquidating their loans all have
low private signals of the fundamental θ, and the effect of a good rating on those creditors'
beliefs tends to be greater than the corresponding effect of a bad rating.
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We next discuss the effect of the approximation made in (A2) concerning investors' up-
dating of beliefs. This approximation vastly simplifies the technical analysis by ensuring that
if the information provided by the rating is fully consistent with the investor's own signal, the
rating has no effect on the beliefs of the investor. Thus, a rating only affects the beliefs of the
investor when it restricts the possible interval for θ. With Bayesian updating, i.e. without
this approximation, any rating will in general affect the beliefs of the investor. Yet, it will still
be the case that an investor's beliefs are more affected by ratings whose information content
overlap less with the investor's prior beliefs. Thus, when λ > 1/2, which implies that xM > λ,
a negative rating based on a threshold τ = λ will have a larger impact on the marginal in-
vestor's beliefs than a positive rating will have. We thus expect the insights of this paper to
remain valid also without the approximation implied by (A2).
We conclude this section with a discussion of assumption (A4). As noted above, the lower
bound on α in (A4) guarantees a unique rating equilibrium. As α becomes small, the CRA's
rating alone may determine whether or not the sovereign defaults. This is best illustrated by
the extreme case where α = 0. Suppose that the CRA with α = 0 uses an arbitrary strategy
τ ∈ (0, 1). Then, if the CRA issues a negative rating, investors will know for sure that θ < 1,
as otherwise default would be impossible, and the rating wrong with certainty. Likewise, if
the CRA issues a positive rating, investors will know for sure that θ > 0, as otherwise default
would be certain. By Lemma 2.7 and 2.8, it then follows that θ∗(r = 1) = 0 and θ∗(r = 0) = 1,
which implies that for all θ ∈ (0, 1) the rating determines the outcome. As τ ∈ (0, 1) and
α = 0, this implies that at y = τ the CRA is indifferent between announcing r = 0 and r = 1:
In both cases the CRA is able to make a correct prediction with probability 1. Hence, any
τ ∈ (0, 1) is in fact part of a rating equilibrium. Multiple rating equilibria thus exist. In this
case, Proposition 1 may no longer hold for all possible equilibria. For example, if λ = 0.9,
then the equilibrium impact of a good rating is λ− θ∗(r = 1) = 0.9, whereas the equilibrium
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impact of a bad rating is θ∗(r = 0) − λ = 0.1. However, in the appendix, Proposition 4, we
show that the results of Proposition 1 will hold even if (A4) is not satisfied, as long as the
θ∗-threshold is within the interval (0, 1).
Notably, the discussion above implies that the mere presence of a CRA with accurate
information may cause equilibrium multiplicity. This insight is central in Carlson and Hale
(2006), who study a CRA that non-strategically passes its private information on to the
market. Our analysis shows that this insight will also hold when the CRA acts strategically.
Notably, though, there is a subtle conceptual difference. When the CRA passes its information
directly on, accuracy induces multiplicity in the game played between investors. In our setting
with strategically chosen binary ratings, multiplicity arises as the CRA is indifferent between
selecting alternative equilibria in the investment game. However, within the investment game,
the equilibrium is unique.13
3.3. Equilibrium Frequency of Good and Bad Ratings
CRAs have been accused of delivering excessively many good ratings.14 The theoretical
literature has typically focused on the role of `rating shopping' in explaining that phenomenom.
`Rating shopping' describes the ability of issuers to pay for and disclose ratings after they
privately observe them. However, that explanation is less relevant for sovereign debt, as credit
rating is then typically unsolicited. This Section examines the respective frequency of good
and bad ratings arising in the equilibrium of our model and shows that, when λ is low, then
the frequency of a good rating is high compared to the `private' assessment of an independent
observer based on the same information as the ratings of the CRA. By symmetry, when λ is
13Related here is also the study by Angeletos and Werning (2006), who show how an endogenous source
of public information, an asset price in their model, enlarges the scope for equilibrium multiplicity to arise.
Although ratings constitute an endogenous signal in our model, that phenomenon does not arise because
ratings never are sufficiently precise to induce multiplicity in the investment game.
14See, e.g., Skreta and Veldkamp (2009) or Sangiorgi and Spatt (2011).
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high, we show that the frequency of a bad rating is high compared to the `private' assessment
of an independent observer. Our model thus suggests that in times of booms, credit rating of
sovereign debt may appear overly generous, whereas during crises, credit rating of sovereign
debt can appear overly harsh.
Recall that in the absence of credit rating, the critical value for the fundamental θ∗(Θ) = λ.
Thus, as the signal y is distributed symmetrically around θ, an independent observer aiming to
maximize chances of making a correct prediction would (a) forecast repayment for y ≥ λ, and
(b) forecast default for y < λ. This implies that if in a rating equilibrium the CRA strategy is
τ < λ, then in that equilibrium the frequency of good ratings is higher than the frequency with
which an independent observer would forecast repayment. Similarly, if in a rating equilibrium
the CRA strategy is τ > λ, then in that equilibrium bad ratings are more frequent than the
default forecasts of an independent observer would be. These remarks motivate the following
definition:
Definition 1. A CRA strategy τ exhibits an excess of good ratings if τ < λ, and exhibits an
excess of bad ratings if τ > λ.
We next show that rating equilibria exhibit an excess of good ratings when λ is small, and
an excess of bad ratings when λ is large. The intuition for that result is as follows. Suppose
for the sake of illustration that λ > max{1/2, α/(2β)}. We argued in Section 3.2 that in this
case a CRA using strategy τ = λ would have a greater impact with a bad rating than with
a good rating. But note that then, if it observed the signal y = τ , the CRA would prefer
announcing r = 0 to announcing r = 1 because the bad rating would be more likely to come
true. It follows that in this case equilibrium must entail τ > λ, that is, an excess of bad
ratings.
Proposition 2. Assume (A1)-(A4). Then:
1. for λ ∈ [1− α/(2β), α/(2β)], the rating equilibrium has τ = λ.
2. for λ < min{1/2, 1− α/(2β)}, the rating equilibrium exhibits an excess of good ratings,
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3. for λ > max{1/2, α/(2β)}, the rating equilibrium exhibits an excess of bad ratings.
The basic intuiton behind Proposition 2 is straightforward: when CRAs are motivated by
the desire to make correct predictions, then a rating affecting the default outcome becomes
attractive. Since with high λ a bad rating has more effect on the outcome than a good one,
this implies that bad ratings are attractive when λ is high; by the same token, good ratings
are attractive when λ is low.
3.4. Main Result
This section contains our main theorem, showing that the equilibrium impact of credit
rating is procyclical.
Let p0 denote the probability of default in the absence of credit rating. Then, by (1),
p0 = P(θ < θ∗(Θ)) = P(θ < λ) and clearly p0 is increasing in λ. So, even without credit
rating, default risk is high when λ is large. We now show that the equilibrium impact of
credit rating is procyclical: credit rating raises the probability of default when it is high (i.e.
when λ is high), and reduces it when it is low (i.e. when λ is low).
Theorem 1. Assume (A1)-(A4). For λ ∈ [1− α/(2β), α/(2β)], the probability of default is
p0, as it is without credit rating. Otherwise, the impact of credit rating is procyclical: in the
unique rating equilibrium the probability of default is smaller than p0 for λ < min{1/2, 1 −
α/(2β)}, and greater than p0 for λ > max{1/2, α/(2β)}.
Proof: Let L := Θ−Θ. Then p0 = P(θ < λ) = (λ−Θ) /L. Consider next the probability of
default P(I = 0) calculated in the rating equilibrium. Let τ ∗ denote the equilibrium strategy
of the CRA. Then:
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P(I = 0) = P
(
θ < θ∗(r = 1)
)
+ P
(
θ∗(r = 1) ≤ θ < θ∗(r = 0))P(y < τ ∗|θ∗(r = 1) ≤ θ < θ∗(r = 0))
=
θ∗(r = 1)−Θ
L
+
1
2
(
θ∗(r = 0)− θ∗(r = 1)
L
)
=
θ∗(r=0)+θ∗(r=1)
2
−Θ
L
=
τ ∗ −Θ
L
,
where the second and last equality follow from noting that τ ∗ = (θ∗(R = 0) + θ∗(R = 1)) /2
(we show this formally in the appendix). From Proposition 2, τ ∗ > λ if λ > max{1/2, α/(2β)},
implying that P(I = 0) > p0. Likewise, if λ < min{1/2, 1 − α/(2β)}, then τ ∗ < λ, implying
that P(I = 0) < p0. 
4. Conclusion
Credit rating agencies have recently been criticized on different and often opposing grounds,
in particular for being too lenient before the 2007-08 financial crisis, and for propagating
refinancing problems thereafter. Our analysis shows that in markets where coordination failure
is possible, specifically the sovereign debt market, there is a channel that generates such effects.
We find that when aggregate liquidity is easy, sovereign ratings will be inflated and on average
decrease coordination risk. Hence, credit ratings will tend to ease sovereign refinancing when
the market initially is in a good state. By contrast, when liquidity is tight, ratings are
deflated and make it even harder to roll sovereign debt over. While existing studies focus on
how an issuer bias in CRA payoffs generates rating inflation, our study shows how an excessive
frequency of positive ratings might arise due to booming market conditions. This is a novel
prediction which may be tested empirically. To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the
first to simultaneously: (i) account for strategic behavior on the part of CRAs, (ii) allow for
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the possibility that ratings affect the performance of the rated objects, and (iii) endogenize
investors' response to credit ratings.
5. Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1: To show existence, we consider 3 cases in turn:
Case 1: R ≥ 0. By (A1) each investor's posterior beliefs attach probability 1 to θ ≥ 0. Hence,
an equilibrium of the investment game exists in which σi(xi, R) = 1, for all i and xi.
Case 2: R < 1. By (A1) each investor's posterior beliefs attach probability 1 to θ < 1. Hence,
an equilibrium of the investment game exists in which σi(xi, R) = 0, for all i and xi.
Case 3: R < 0 and R ≥ 1. Suppose R = Θ. We will show that an equilibrium exists such that
σi(xi;R) = 1 ⇔ xi ≥ x∗(R). Clearly, if it exists then that equilibrium has θ∗(R) such
that I = 1⇔ θ ≥ θ∗(R). The indifference equation of the marginal investor rolling over
his loan is Pˆ(θ > θ∗(R)|x∗(R), R) = λ, and θ∗(R) satisfies θ∗(R) = P(x < x∗(R)|θ =
θ∗(R)). Let
H1 := {(x∗, θ∗) : θ∗ = P(x < x∗|θ = θ∗)},
H2 := {(x∗, θ∗) : Pˆ(θ ≥ θ∗|x∗, R) = λ}.
H1 and H2 constitute continuous curves in the (x
∗, θ∗)-space. H1 is flat in the half
spaces x∗ < −β and x∗ > 1 + β, and coincides in between with the graph of θ∗ =
x∗ + β/ (2β + 1). H2 coincides with the graph of θ∗ = x∗+[2β(1−λ)−β] for x∗ < R−β,
and with the graph of θ∗ = λx∗ + [R(1 − λ) − λβ] for x∗ ∈ [R − β,R + β]. H1 and H2
thus cross at least once. They cross exactly once if 1/ (2β + 1) < λ.
The case R = Θ is similar. H1 is unchanged. H2 now coincides with the graph of θ
∗ =
x∗+[2β(1−λ)−β] for x∗ > R+β, and with the graph of θ∗ = (1−λ)x∗+[(β−R)(1−λ)+R]
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for x∗ ∈ [R− β,R + β]. H1 and H2 thus cross at least once. They cross exactly once if
1/ (2β + 1) < 1− λ.
Uniqueness follows from standard arguments in global games (see e.g. Morris and Shin
(2006)) together with the remarks that (a) H1 and H2 never intersect in Cases 1 and 2, (b)
H1 and H2 cross exactly once in Case 3 if 1/(2β + 1) < λ < 1− 1/(2β + 1), and (c) in Case 3,
investors with signals below −β must liquidate whereas investors with signals 1 + β or above
must roll over. Hence, `corner' equilbria are precluded in Case 3, just as `interior' equilibria
are precluded in Cases 1 and 2.
For the last part of the lemma, set (a) θ∗(R) = 0 and x∗(R) = Θ in Case 1 and (b)
θ∗(R) = 1 and x∗(R) = Θ in Case 2. 
Proof of Lemma 2: Following the arguments of the proof of Lemma 1, the unique
equilibrium without credit rating is obtained by solving θ
∗ = x
∗+β
2β+1
θ∗ = x∗ + [2β(1− λ)− β].
This yields  θ
∗ = λ
x∗ = λ(2β + 1)− β.
Properties 1-8 are now immediate from inspection of H1 and H2 defined in the proof of Lemma
1. 
Proof of Propositions 1 and 2 Fix τ , and consider the CRA with signal y. By
Lemma 1 the probability P(I = 0|y,R = 0) of a correct prediction following rating R = 0
is θ∗(R−τ+α)− (y − α)/ (2α) if y ∈ [θ∗(R−τ+α) − α, θ∗(R−τ+α) + α], 0 above θ∗(R−τ+α) + α, and
1 below θ∗(R−τ+α) − α. Similarly, the probability P(I = 1|y,R = 1) of a correct prediction
following rating R = 1 is (y + α)− θ∗(R+τ−α)/ (2α) if y ∈ [θ∗(R+τ−α) − α, θ∗(R+τ−α) + α], 1
above θ∗(R+τ−α) + α, and 0 below θ
∗(R+τ−α) − α. In particular (a) P(I = 0|y,R = 0) and
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P(I = 1|y,R = 1) are continuous in y, (b) P(I = 0|y,R = 0) is non-increasing in y, and (c)
P(I = 1|y,R = 1) is non-decreasing in y. Hence, the indifference condition
(3) P(I = 0|τ ∗, R−τ∗+α) = P(I = 1|τ ∗, R+τ∗−α)
is necessary and sufficient for a rating equilibrium.
By Lemma 2.6, θ∗(R−τ∗+α) and θ
∗(R+τ∗−α) are continuous in τ
∗. Hence both sides of (3) are
continuous in τ ∗. By Lemma 2.7, the left hand side of (3) is 1 for τ ∗ + α < 1 while the right
hand side is 1 for τ ∗−α > 0 . Note too that the left hand side of (3) is 0 for τ ∗−α > 1 while
the right hand side is 0 for τ ∗ + α < 0 . These observations show that a rating equilibrium
exists.
To show uniqueness, note first that if one of the two sides in (3) is 0 then the other side of
the equation must be 1. For example, if the right hand side is 0 then τ ∗+α ≤ θ∗(R+τ∗−α) ≤ λ,
where the last inequality follows from Lemma 2.1. But then as (using Lemma 2.1 again)
θ∗(R−τ∗+α) ≥ λ, we find that the left hand side of (3) is 1. Next, Lemma 2.2 shows that
wherever the left hand side is in (0, 1), it is strictly decreasing in τ ∗, and 2.3 shows that
wherever the right hand side is in (0, 1), it is strictly increasing in τ ∗. Hence the two sides
in (3) cross at most once provided α > 1/2. We now show that the latter condition holds.
We consider two cases. Case 1: λ ≥ 1/2. Then min{λ, 1 − λ} = 1 − λ, and by assumption
α ≥ 2β(1−λ), so it is enough to show 2β(1−λ) > 1/2. However by (A3): 1−1/ (2β + 1) > λ.
This yields 2β(1 − λ) > λ and ultimately 2β(1 − λ) > 1/2. Case 2: λ < 1/2. Then
min{λ, 1− λ} = λ, and by assumption α ≥ 2βλ, so it is enough to show 2βλ > 1/2. However
by (A3): λ > 1/ (2β + 1). This yields 2βλ > 1− λ and ultimately 2βλ > 1/2.
Finally, we prove properties 1-3 of Proposition 1. We consider two cases separately.
Case 1: α ≥ β. By inspection of H1 and H2 defined in the proof of Lemma 1, α ≥ β implies
that for any τ at most one rating impacts default outcome: either θ∗(R+τ−α) = λ or
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θ∗(R−τ+α) = λ. So we only need to check the conditions for which θ
∗(R+λ−α) < λ and
θ∗(R−λ+α) > λ, respectively. By Lemma 2.5, θ
∗(R+λ−α) < λ⇔ λ−α > (2β+1)λ−2β, i.e.
if and only if λ < 1− α/ (2β). When the condition holds then at τ ∗ = λ the right hand
side of (3) is strictly larger than the left hand side of (3). Hence, using arguments from
the first part of the proof, in a rating equilbrium: τ ∗ < λ. Since in a rating equilibrium
we also have τ ∗ = θ∗(R = 0) + θ∗(R = 1)/2 (formally, this is a consequence of the fact
shown above that α > 1/2), we obtain λ − θ∗(R = 1) > θ∗(R = 0) − λ. Similarly, one
shows that θ∗(R−λ+α) > λ⇔ λ > α/(2β).
Case 2: α < β. Assume first λ > 1/2. We claim that θ∗(R−λ+α) > λ, whereas θ
∗(R+λ−α) = λ. For
the first part of the claim, by Lemma 2.4 we need to show that λ + α < (2β + 1)λ, i.e.
α < 2βλ. But by assumption we have λ > 1/2 and α < β, so we are done with the first
part of the claim. For the second part, inspection of H1 and H2 defined in the proof of
Lemma 1 shows that for the claim to hold it is enough that λ−α+β ≤ λ(2β+1)−β (the
left hand side is the horizontal coordinate of the kink inH2, and the right hand side is the
x-threshold of the equilibrium without credit rating uncovered in the proof of Lemma 2).
This is the same as α ≥ 2β(1−λ), which holds by assumption since α ≥ 2βmin{λ, 1−λ}
and λ > 1/2. Now one implication of the claim is that at τ ∗ = λ the left hand side of
(3) is strictly larger than the right hand side of (3). Hence, using arguments from the
first part of the proof, in a rating equilbrium: τ ∗ > λ. Since in a rating equilibrium we
also have τ ∗ = θ∗(R = 0) + θ∗(R = 1)/2, we obtain θ∗(R = 0)−λ > λ− θ∗(R = 1). The
case where λ < 1/2 is symmetric. The case where λ = 1/2 does not apply here since
λ = 1/2⇒ 2βmin{λ, 1− λ} = β, and by assumption α ≥ 2βmin{λ, 1− λ}.

Proposition 3. Assume (A1)-(A3). There exists at least one rating equilibrium. In any
equilibrium θ∗(R = 1) ≤ λ ≤ θ∗(R = 0) and one (or more) of the following holds:
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1. θ∗(r = 0) = 1,
2. θ∗(r = 1) = 0,
3. (a) if λ = 1/2: θ∗(r = 0)− λ = λ− θ∗(r = 1),
(b) if λ > 1/2: θ∗(r = 0)− λ > λ− θ∗(r = 1) > 0,
(c) if λ < 1/2: λ− θ∗(r = 1) > θ∗(r = 0)− λ > 0.
Proof of Proposition 3: For existence, the proof of Proposition 1 applies. We next show
the second part of the propositon.
Assume first λ > 1/2. Inspection of H1 and H2 defined in the proof of Lemma 1 shows
that either (i) θ∗(R−λ+α) − λ > λ − θ∗(R+λ−α) or (ii) θ∗(R−λ+α) = 1. In Case (i), at τ ∗ = λ
the left hand side of (3) is strictly larger than the right hand side of (3). Hence, in a rating
equilbrium: τ ∗ > λ. Since in a rating equilibrium we also have τ ∗ = θ∗(R = 0) + θ∗(R = 1)/2,
Case 3.b of the proposition holds. In Case (ii), at τ ∗ = λ either the left hand side of (3) is
strictly larger than the right hand side of (3), and then the previous argument applies, or the
left hand side is weakly smaller than the right hand side, in which case τ ∗ ≤ λ in a rating
equilibrium and, using Lemma 2.2, Case 1 of the proposition holds
The case where λ < 1/2 is symmetric. The case λ = 1/2 is trivial. 
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